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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Allen Lee Moore appeals from the district court’s restitution order.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Moore with one count of aggravated battery and one count of
felony domestic violence. (R., pp.47-48.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state,
Moore pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and to a reduced charge of misdemeanor
battery. (R., pp.61-63; 10/24/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-21.) The district court sentenced Moore to
ten years imprisonment with two years fixed on the felony count, gave him credit for time
served on the misdemeanor, and placed Moore on probation. (R., pp.81-82.)
The state requested a restitution order at the sentencing hearing. (10/24/17 Tr.,
p.16, L.11 – p.17, L.6.) At that point $1,650.39 of medical expenses, “to pay back
Medicaid and Saint Al’s Medical Center,” had already accrued. (10/24/17 Tr., p. 16,
Ls.11-13.) However, the state requested 90 days to fully calculate restitution because the
aggravated-battery victim—who Moore punched in the face—”was very fearful of
dentists,” and the state “need[ed] to follow up with him to just make sure that all of his
bills are covered for the splinting of his teeth.” (10/24/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-21; PSI, p.4.)
Moreover, the state reported that its restitution department was “having some difficulty in
contacting [the victim] to confirm that he doesn’t have any out-of-pocket expenses.”
(10/24/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.21-24.)
So the state informed the court that it would appreciate “a little bit more time on
the restitution, … otherwise, at this point, [the restitution] stands at, again, $1,650.39.”
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(10/24/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-6.) Moore had no objection to the request at that time; as
defense counsel put it, Moore was hopeful to be placed on probation in part because
“[t]hat will give more than adequate time for him to go through the treatment, get the
restitution paid that he needs to pay.” (10/24/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-15.)
The district court granted the state’s request with a caveat: it proposed leaving
restitution open for just 60 days as opposed to 90. (10/24/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.9-10.) The
prosecutor indicated 60 days would be sufficient, so the court left restitution open for 60
days for the state to “either submit a stipulation as to the appropriate restitution order …
or file a motion, and the matter will be set for hearing to determine an appropriate amount
of restitution.” (10/24/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-19.) The Judgment of Conviction, formally
directing the state “to notice restitution for hearing if the parties cannot stipulate to an
amount within 60 days,” was entered on October 30, 2017. (R., p.85.)
On January 23, 2018, the state filed its motion for a restitution order, along with
supporting documentation from St. Alphonsus, Medicaid, and the Crime Victims
Compensation Program, in which it sought a total of $2,135.63 for the Victims
Compensation Program and for Medicaid reimbursement.

(R., pp.91-97.)

Moore

objected to the request because it was “roughly 30 days late.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.1216.) The prosecutor agreed the request was late and explained that there had been a
clerical error: after sentencing the prosecutor “emailed [the] restitution end of the
department and told them that it was due in 60 days”; but, it was “most common” for the
state to have 90 days to finalize restitution. (3/22/18 Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.1.) As a
result, the state’s restitution department “mis-calendared it” and had it ready “within 90
days,” but not within the 60 days the court ordered. (3/22/18 Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.3.)
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Moore conceded that the error, and the ensuing 25-day delay, was not prejudicial
to him. As he put it, the late filing “didn’t affect our ability to defend this,” and he had
“no objections on the merits” of the request. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-18; p.15, Ls.14-18.)
Nevertheless, he argued that the restitution statute’s grant of time to “gather information”
was preconditioned on the state showing the additional time was necessary. (3/22/18 Tr.,
p.11, Ls.7-23.) And here, Moore argued, the state had not shown that the “additional time
past the 60 days was necessary.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.11, L.23 – p.12, L.5.)
The state asked for relief from the original deadline because it “believe[d] that 90days is still a reasonable time” given the number of victims, the conceded lack of
prejudice, and the evidence showing that at least some of the restitution information was
not received until after the original deadline. (3/22/18 Tr., p.9, L.16 – p.11, L.5; p.12,
L.19 – p.13, L.10.)
The district court ultimately concluded that it would “relieve the State” of the
original deadline. (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-7.) The court’s primary rationale was that the
restitution statute created a “mandatory directive” to enter a restitution order in cases such
as these. (3/22/18 Tr., p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.4.) Furthermore, Moore was still on probation
(see
- - R., p.135) and the case was “still ongoing” (3/22/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-22). The court
also noted it was relieving the state of the deadline “not because, necessarily, the victims
coordinator’s office was dilatory, but because it does appear that—at least as to part of the
restitution requested, that it was simply—the information wasn’t available.” (3/22/18 Tr.,
p.15, Ls.5-11.) The district court “perceive[d] no real injury” to Moore, who “caused the
damage,” and noted that all of the “submitted materials” appeared accurate: “it was the
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right people and the right dates, and they are hospital charges.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.1322.)
Moore raised two last points. First, he claimed that relieving the state of its
deadline would result in a restitution order that would be entered “after the time that the
Court [originally] ordered,” contravening the restitution statute. (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.217.)

The district court disagreed, and clarified that the restitution deadlines were

procedural in nature:
And in response to that, I guess my ruling would be—or my observation
would be that, at the time of sentencing in this case when I inquired, the
parties were not prepared to stipulate to restitution. And because of the
nature of my calendar, it’s not—and because of my view of restitution—
it’s not part of the punishment; it is reimbursement for damage done—and
because of my calendar, we simply can’t, at the time of sentencing, take a
time-out to have a full-blown restitution hearing. The time just simply
doesn’t allow it. And so that’s why I routinely continue them.
And the deadlines that I set, as I have said, have been because I just think
it’s necessary to have a point at which something is due so it doesn’t get
lost.
So I will maintain my original ruling.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.11.)
Lastly, Moore sought some clarification:
[Defense counsel]: And, Your Honor, my last question is, the Court said
that it appears that the information from Crime Victims Compensation, the
reason for the filing it that late, was due to the lack of information. Is the
Court holding the same as to the Medicaid?
THE COURT: I am. What I am going to say is that, given the fact that the
deadline really is not hard and fast by statute, and the reason I put it there
is to have a time where these things come to an end, but I am not intending
to get—but I don’t think that that procedural device should overrule the
mandates of the statute.
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In other words, I don’t think a procedure should get in the way of the
merits.
(3/22/18 Tr., p.17, L.18 – p.18, L.7.)
The district court entered an Order for Restitution and Judgment in the amount of
$1,650.39. 1 (R., pp.126-28.) Moore timely appealed. (R., pp.139-41, 143-47.)

1

The state’s eventual motion for restitution requested $2,135.63. (R., p.91.) The record
does not clearly show why the district court ultimately ordered restitution in the
originally-requested amount of $1,650.39 instead. (See R.)
5

ISSUE
Moore states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it accepted the State’s late
restitution request and awarded restitution because the only reason for the
delay was that the State had miscalendared the deadline?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Moore failed to show the district court abused its discretion by relieving the state of a
restitution deadline, after a harmless clerical error, while Moore was still on probation?
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ARGUMENT
Moore Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relieving The State
Of A Restitution Deadline, Following A Harmless Clerical Error, While Moore Was Still
On Probation
A.

Introduction
In what was a harmless clerical error, the state missed a court-set deadline to

submit its restitution request. Moore, who at that time was still on probation, conceded
the 25-day delay was benign: he admitted he was “not prejudiced by the late filing,” that
“[i]t didn’t affect our ability to defend this,” and he had no challenge whatsoever to the
merits of the state’s request. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-18; p.15, Ls.14-18; see R., p.135.)
Moore also stipulated that at least some of the information was provided to the state after
the original deadline had passed. (See 3/22/18 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.1.)
Based on all of this the district court “relieve[d] the State of the deadline” it had
previously set. (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-7.) Moore fails to show that the district court
abused its discretion when it did so.

B.

Standard Of Review
Ordering restitution “is within the discretion of a trial court, guided by

consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy favoring full
compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss.” State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho
35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002). Consequently, Idaho’s appellate courts “will
not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown.” Id. In
determining whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court examines “whether
the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
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the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and
(3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 695,
390 P.3d 418, 421 (2017). The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution
will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Relieved The State Of The Restitution
Deadline
Idaho’s restitution statute does not fix a deadline in which the state must gather

information and submit requests for restitution. Rather,
[r]estitution orders shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing
or such later date as deemed necessary by the court. Economic loss shall
be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the
prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator.
I.C. § 19-5304(6) (emphasis added). Thus, as Section 19-5304(6) makes clear, “this
section contemplates that the court may need to grant the prosecution a reasonable
amount of time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims and correctly
compute the amount of restitution.” State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762, 241 P.3d 1, 5
(Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis in original, quoting State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662, 67
P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002)). Under this standard a restitution order entered six
years after the final judgment—where “[t]he district court made no finding … that the
delay was reasonably necessary for the processing of the request for restitution”—would
be invalid. Jensen, 149 Idaho at 763, 241 P.3d at 6. Likewise, a trial court may not
“reopen [a] case two years after discharging [a defendant] from probation” to enter a sixyear-old restitution order—because the statute “does not … vest the court with the power
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to extend the entry of the order of restitution beyond the closing of the case and the
discharge of the defendant.” Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 1274.
But this appeal raises a separate question, which the Idaho Court of Appeals has
already squarely addressed: whether a current probationer would be treated the same if a
prosecutor failed to submit a restitution request by the original deadline. State v. Dorsey,
126 Idaho 659, 889 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1995). In Dorsey, the district court “had ordered
the payment of restitution in the original probation order of April 25, 1991, but without
stating the amounts or identifying the payees.” 126 Idaho at 661, 889 P.2d at 95. Much
like the Judgment of Conviction here, the April 25 order in Dorsey provided that “[t]he
sums are to be established by the Prosecuting Attorney; copies of the sums are to be
submitted to [defense counsel] and the Court within thirty (30) days of this date.” Id. at
660, 889 P.2d at 94.
As it turned out, the Dorsey prosecutor did not submit a letter itemizing “payees
and amounts for restitution” to the district court until January 4, 1994—several years past
the 30-day deadline.

Id.

The prosecutor informed the court that many things had

contributed to the delay, including an “oversight” in which “a copy was not provided to
the court nor to the probation department,” despite sending the original letter to defense
counsel way back in 1991. Id. Nevertheless, on “March 11, 1994, the district court
entered an order requiring Dorsey to pay restitution in the amounts previously submitted
by the prosecutor.” Id. at 661, 889 P.2d at 95.
On appeal Dorsey made a familiar argument: that “an abuse of discretion has been
sufficiently established in this case through the district court’s acceptance of the
prosecutor’s claim for the sums due after the prosecutor had failed to comply with the
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probation order entered in April, 1991, which required the submission of a claim within
thirty days.” Id. Dorsey argued that the late submission “precluded the district court
from further exercising its discretion with regard to the question of restitution.” Id.
But the Dorsey Court was “not persuaded.” Id. The Court pointed out that,
[a]lthough the order specified that the prosecutor would establish the sums due and
submit a claim to defense counsel and the court within thirty days, the order did not
purport to limit the recovery of restitution nor impose any sanction for noncompliance on
the part of the prosecutor.” Id. Moreover, the district court “retained jurisdiction during
the probation period, with authority to modify the terms and conditions of probation,”
which is precisely what its subsequent restitution order did. Id. Thus, the Dorsey Court
concluded the district court “was clearly within its discretionary authority in light of the
relevant statutes” when it ordered restitution beyond the original deadline—despite the
order being predicated on a years-late request. Id.
The district court here was just as clearly within its discretionary authority to
relieve the state of the court-imposed deadline. The Judgment of Conviction did not
purport to limit the state’s restitution recovery nor did it contemplate any sanctions for
missing the deadline. (R., p.85.) The original deadline was not fixed by statute or
otherwise immutable—it was set by the court itself, which concluded it was necessary to
move the deadline both to further the goals of the restitution statute and because it
appeared the state did not have all the necessary information. (3/22/18 Tr., p.14, L.23 –
p.15, L.11.) Moreover, the district court correctly perceived that, unlike Ferguson, which
was a “case that was closed and over,” this case was “still ongoing,” as Moore was still
on probation. (3/22/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-15; see R., p.135.) Last but not least, Moore
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conceded the mistake was harmless; he readily admitted he was not prejudiced by the 25day delay and that he had no objection to the request on the merits. (3/22/18 Tr., p.12,
Ls.6-13; p.15, Ls.14-18.) Given all the facts, and the clear precedent set by Dorsey, the
district court plainly had the discretion to allow the state to submit its restitution request
past the original deadline.
Moore fails to show this was an abuse of discretion. His argument below was the
remarkable proposition that once the district court’s restitution deadline was set, it could
not be altered. (3/22/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-17.) In effect, his claim was that the court’s
deadline-setting discretion was a one-shot power—and that “after the time that the Court”
originally ordered the submission of restitution it could no longer revisit it. (See 3/22/18
Tr., p.16, Ls.11-17.)
The district court rightly rejected this argument because the “deadline really is not
hard and fast by statute”—indeed, the statute vests the district court with the discretion to
create the deadline in the first place. (3/22/18 Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.5; see I.C. § 195304(6)). Logically, the discretion to set deadlines encompasses the discretion to reset
them, especially when the criminal case is ongoing (which is precisely why, the district
court pointed out, restitution hearings are “routinely continue[d]”). (See Tr., p.17, Ls.210.) No language in the statute, or Dorsey’s interpretation of it, suggests the deadline was
set in stone, or that any attempt to fiddle with it would be an abuse of discretion. See I.C.
§ 19-5304; see also 126 Idaho 659, 889 P.2d 93.
On appeal Moore has wisely abandoned this approach. He now reiterates his
more narrow claim that “the district court did not act consistently with I.C. § 19-5304(6)
when it awarded restitution outside of the sixty-day window because it was not actually
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‘necessary’ to enter the restitution order at such a late date.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
Moore points to metadata in the restitution supporting documents that arguably show that
the documents “were generated months before.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6 (citing R.,
pp.93-97).) Thus, Moore concludes, “the court’s finding that the victims were unable to
provide the restitution documentation to the state within the sixty-day deadline is not
supported by substantial evidence.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)
This argument fails, first, because it ignores the fact that the state did not receive
the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program’s final statement until January 23, 2018,
which is the same day the state filed its restitution motion with the court. (R., pp.91, 96;
3/22/18 Tr., p.9, L.16 – p.10, L.6; p.12, L.23 – p.14, L.2.) Below, Moore stipulated that
“the State received a letter dated January 23rd from the Industrial Commission, their
Crime Victims Compensation program.” (3/22/18 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.1.) This
stipulated fact is itself substantial evidence supporting the court’s conclusion that the
state needed more than 60 days to gather restitution. (3/22/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-11; p.17,
Ls.18-24.)
Beyond this, Moore’s argument assumes too much. Isolated dates and references
to document generation in the medical records do not show, as Moore prematurely
concludes, that “the information was available to the victims well before the deadline.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) For example, cryptic coding in the Saint Alphonsus documents
that the “Current Date” was “8/18/2017,” and that the document was “Printed by User ID:
fpsz3832” is not proof that the documents were, in fact, printed on that date. (See R.,
p.93.) Even assuming the enigmatic fpsz3832 hit the print button on August 18, that is
not proof that the document was then instantly available to the victims or the state. One
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dreams of a world where medical recordkeeping could be so easy. Wishful thinking
aside, just because the metadata seem to show that someone, somewhere may have
printed the restitution documents prior to the restitution deadline, does not establish the
victims or state likewise had unfettered access to them.
Finally, this line of argument overlooks why the state sought 90 days to fully
calculate restitution in the first place. At the time of the sentencing hearing, the state had
obviously already received some preliminary restitution information; it informed the court
that the total restitution “at this point … stands at, again, $1,650.39.” (10/24/17 Tr., p.17,
Ls.3-6.) Nevertheless, the state requested 90 additional days because the state “need[ed]
to follow up with [the victim] to just make sure that all of his bills are covered for the
splinting of his teeth.” (10/24/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-21.) On account of this, as well as
some dentophobia and “difficulty in contacting” the victim, the state sought 90 days to
ensure that it had all the relevant information—to which Moore had no objection.
(10/24/17 Tr., p.16, L.15 – p.17, L.7.) Because the state had a continuing interest in
monitoring the victim’s health, Moore cannot show that, even if the state had access to
some of the documents ahead of time, that additional time was unnecessary. In any event,
Moore fails to show an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the restitution order.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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